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EMPLOYMENT LAW-ANTIDISCRIMINATION--UNPAID AND
UNPROTECTED: PROTECTING OUR NATION'S VOLUNTEERS THROUGH
TITLE VII
I. INTRODUCTION
It was once said that "[v]olunteers don't get paid not because they are
worthless, but because they are priceless."' Our country has always de-
pended on the work of volunteers.2 In 2007, more than sixty million Amer-
icans volunteered in the nonprofit sector alone.3 This figure does not even
include unpaid work in public and for-profit industries, usually in the form
of internships. Trying to calculate the sheer economic value of volunteer
work to our country is near impossible.
Recognizing the impact and necessity of volunteers, United States
presidents have done their part to encourage volunteerism in the last few
decades. President Richard Nixon established National Volunteer Week in
1974 to celebrate volunteering. 4 In 1987, President Ronald Reagan created
the President's Volunteer Award.5 President George H.W. Bush established
the Points of Light Foundation, a private foundation committed to furthering
volunteer efforts.6  He also established a White House office to promote
volunteerism. 7 In the 1990s, President Bill Clinton was instrumental in the
creation of the Corporation for National Service, an entity that would over-
see AmeriCorps and other volunteer programs.8 In 2005, President George
W. Bush called upon Americans to "recognize and celebrate the important
work" of volunteers. 9 Now, President Barack Obama has proposed a plan
1. Sherry Anderson, Quote, http://www.quotegarden.com/volunteer-apprec.htm (last
visited Aug. 3, 2009).
2. See Diane C. Desautels, Statutory Protection for Volunteers Against Discrimination:
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities, II W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 93, 93 n.5 (1989). "Voluntarism is deeply rooted in
American culture. In fact, it was the combined efforts of many unnamed volunteers that
marked and shaped the development of the United States." Id.
3. Debra Blum, 26 % of Americans Volunteer, New Study Finds, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, July 27, 2008,
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/5284/26-of-americans-volunteer-new-study-finds (last
visited Aug. 3, 2009). See also Volunteering in America, Corporation for National and
Community Service, http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
4. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volun-
teers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 148 n.3 (2006). Every president since Nixon has also
issued proclamations to promote this event. Id.
5. Id.
6. Jean Baldwin Grossman & Kathryn Furano, Making the Most of Volunteers, 62 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 200 (1999).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 148 n.3 (citing Proclamation No. 7885, 70 Fed. Reg.
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for a massive expansion of AmeriCorps and Peace Corps, hoping to more
than double their size.' 0 In addition, President Obama's plan seeks to ex-
pand programs that help match individuals with volunteer opportunities and
provide incentives for those who do volunteer."
Despite these efforts to increase awareness of and participation in vo-
lunteerism, such efforts have not been matched by increased protections for
volunteers. Courts have not applied the statutory protections that exist for
paid employees to unpaid workers, and legislatures have failed to increase
protections for volunteers as well.'
2
Consider, for example, the following situation: two individuals work
for the same company, and each performs the same job duties. Unfortunate-
ly, each is subjected to discrimination by their employer. In virtually all
aspects, these two individuals are identical. There is one important differ-
ence, however: the first individual is a paid employee, whereas the second is
an unpaid intern-a volunteer.
At first glance, this may appear to be a benign difference, but in reality
the mere fact that the intern is unpaid diminishes that individual's right to
seek a remedy for the discriminatory treatment. The paid employee, on the
other hand, may seek back pay, reinstatement, injunctive relief, compensa-
tory and punitive damages, and more. This inequity is contrary to our coun-
try's public policy of equal and fair treatment and can lead to hostile and
less productive work environments. The best course of action is to amend
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") to include all work-
ers-both paid and unpaid.
This note will discuss the current status of volunteers in America; the
purpose, language, and legislative intent of Title VII; and the tests courts
use to determine who is entitled to statutory protections. This note will then
advocate an amendment to Title VII as well as provide a suggested wording
for such an amendment. Finally, this note will discuss what actions may be
taken in lieu of action by Congress.
II. BACKGROUND
Volunteers offer a variety of services in our lives and communities.
This section will begin by discussing the importance of volunteers in our
country and examining why volunteer protections are needed. 3 A brief
overview of Title VII will explain the purpose behind the Act, examine the
20,265 (Apr. 14, 2005)).
10. Service, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/service (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
11. "The White House" Id.
12. See infra Part 11.
13. See infra Part II.A.
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actual text of the statute, and seek to determine the legislative intent of Title
VII."4 Finally, this section will look at the widespread inconsistency in the
judicial application of Title VII with respect to volunteers and will address
the main tests courts use to determine whether an individual is a employee
within the definition of the Act.'
5
A. The Role and Status of Volunteers in Today's Society
Volunteers are an essential part of our society, economy, and govern-
ment. By definition, a volunteer is "a person who voluntarily undertakes or
expresses a willingness to undertake a service as one who renders a service
or takes part in a transaction while having no legal concern or interest.'
16
Alternatively, a volunteer is "[a] voluntary actor or agent in a transaction;
esp., a person who, without an employer's assent and without any justifica-
tion from legitimate personal interest, helps an employee in the performance
of the employer's business."' 7 For most of us, a volunteer is simply a per-
son who works without pay. Although the term volunteer may bring to
mind a "do-gooder" working in a nonprofit or social service context, in real-
ity, volunteers participate in virtually every industry in our country. Volun-
teers can also be students, interns, and trainees, among others.' 8 They work
in education, government, sales, banking and finance, agriculture, medicine,
manufacturing, transportation, and more.
Generally speaking, our society has a clear public policy against allow-
ing discrimination and harassment based on certain personal characteristics.
Moreover, Congress has enacted laws to prevent this discrimination and
provide remedies for victims.' 9 For example, antidiscrimination legislation
has been passed in a variety of contexts: public accommodations, employ-
ment, tort law, and criminal law.2° Some may claim that unpaid workers are
unlikely to be the victims of discrimination, but as a plethora of case law
shows, this simply is not the case. 2' Employers discriminate against unpaid
workers, and it becomes a matter of which workers are protected by law and
14. See infra Part II.B-D.
15. See infra Part II.E.
16. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (8th ed. 2004).
18. For the sake of simplicity, this note will use the terms "volunteer" and "unpaid
worker" throughout. Readers should understand that these interchangeable terms are meant
to refer to the broad class of those working without a direct salary or wage.
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
20. E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
21. E.g., O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997).
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which are not.22 Determining what statutory law applies is problematic be-
cause unpaid workers do not fit neatly into any of the aforementioned cate-
gories, such as public accommodation law.23 Although some victims may
still have protections through civil torts or criminal prosecution, many feel
that these protections are inadequate and provide an unjust result-
especially in light of the services they are generously providing.
Public accommodation statutes have been used both successfully and
unsuccessfully to protect unpaid workers who are victims of discrimination
or harassment.2 4  Another approach is to use employment statutes. For
those advocating increased volunteer protections, this seems to be the pre-
ferred approach.25
B. Preventing Discrimination Under Title VII
The primary legislation used to prevent discrimination in an employ-
ment context is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was designed, in general, to prevent discrimination in many
facets of American life, such as education, public facilities, and govern-
ment.27 Title VII focuses on preventing discrimination, particularly in an
28employment context. In most instances, Title VII is easily applied. For
example, Jane owns a business and hires John to work for her. She pays
him a salary, and he has a set schedule each week. No one would dispute
that John is Jane's employee. Therefore, Title VII protects John without a
lengthy analysis of whether an employment relationship exists.29 In a situa-
tion with an unpaid worker, such as a volunteer or an intern, that determina-
tion is not as obvious.
Determining whether one is an employee or not for the purposes of
Title VII is a question of federal law, and to determine this, the court must
22. See id.
23. See Lauren Attard, Comment, A Price on Volunteerism: The Public Has a Higher
Duty to Accommodate Volunteers, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1090-91 (2007).
24. See id. (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act's public accommodation
provisions applicability to volunteers).
25. See, e.g., Leda E. Dunn, "Protection " of Volunteers Under the Federal Employment
Law: Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 451, 472 (1992) (advocating for
amendments to federal employment statutes in order to expand coverage to volunteers).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17e (2006).
27. Id
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (listing the proscribed discriminatory employ-
ment practices).
29. Even though an employment relationship clearly exists, it is important to note that
Title VII only covers employers who have fifteen or more employees. See infra note 31.
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consider both the statutory language and the legislative history.30 Because
of a "combination of poor drafting and judicial misinterpretation," 31 there is
often inconsistency in the application of the law and the treatment of work-
ers--especially unpaid workers. This note will next consider both the perti-
nent language of the Act 32 and how the courts have analyzed the legisla-
ture's intent.
C. The Language of Title VII
The first step in any statutory analysis requires a thorough examination
of the statute at issue. The heart of Title VII as applied to discrimination in
employment makes it unlawful for an employer to:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify [the employer's] employees or
applicants in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
33color, religion, sex, or national origin.
This part of the statute is fairly straightforward and clearly identifies
both the prohibited behavior and the protected classes. The confusion, es-
pecially with respect to volunteers and unpaid workers, lies in the definition
section of the statute.34 The statute defines an "employer" as "a person35
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more em-
ployees. 36 An "employee," however, is defined as "an individual employed
by an employer.,
37
30. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983).
31. Dunn, supra note 25, at 472.
32. Title VII encompasses many sections. This note will only focus on § 2000e and
§ 2000e-2(a), however, because these are the only sections pertinent to the current discus-
sion.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
35. "Person" is also defined by the statute and is not limited to individuals; it can also
include governmental agencies, corporations, trusts, and associations, among others. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). The exceptions to this definition are the United
States, a corporation owned by the government, an Indian tribe, certain departments and
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These definitions are circular, unclear, and ambiguous. They provide
little guidance in determining who qualifies as an "employee." By stating
that an employee is "employed by" the employer, the statute emphasizes
that the key determinant is whether an employment relationship exists be-
tween the parties. But what constitutes an employment relationship? The
statute is silent. Congress could have overcome the circular nature of this
definition if it also included a definition of "employed" or "employment,"
but again, the statute is silent. The job of interpreting the statute, therefore,
falls upon courts that must examine the legislature's intentions for both the
Act itself and individual provisions, such as determining what the Act was
designed to accomplish and how it would be accomplished.
D. The Legislative Intent Behind Title VII
Many courts have speculated on Congress' intent in enacting this sec-
tion.38 What was its primary purpose? How broad or narrow did Congress
intend the definitions to be? Congress' expressed objective in enacting Title
VII was to protect the "right of persons to be free from [improper] discrimi-
nation"39 and to eliminate discrimination in employment contexts such as
hiring, firing, compensation, and benefits.4 °
One of the main reasons for this confusion and inconsistency is the de-
finitional problem previously discussed. To deal with this, most courts and
litigants have relied on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning that, in
employment law, statutes should be interpreted in context rather than just
examining their plain meaning.41 Considering the meaning of "employee,"
the Court reasoned that the term should:
not [be] treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite
meaning ... [r]ather it takes color from its surroundings ... [in]
the statute where it appears, and derives meaning from the context
agencies of the District of Columbia, and bona fide private membership clubs. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006). This definition also has exceptions. For example,
state elected officials and their appointed staff are not employees. Because the statute does
not expressly exclude volunteers, many plaintiffs have tried to argue that volunteers are
automatically a protected group. Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795
(E.D. Pa. 1987). Courts have consistently disagreed with this reasoning. Id.
38. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339 (6th Cir. 1983).
39. Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for
the Unpaid Intern, 66 FoRDArmt L. REv. 2613, 2623 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401).
40. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340. ("Title VII ... was enacted for the sole purpose of
eliminating discrimination."). Id.
41. SeeNLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944).
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of that statute, which must be read in light of the mischief to be
corrected and the end to be attained.42
Simply put, the "mischief to be corrected" is the occurrence of discrim-
ination in employment; the "end to be attained" is the prevention of discrim-
ination and the provision of relief to workers.43 Other courts have simply
looked at the ordinary meaning of the terms,44 as well as statements from
one of the Act's initial drafters who stated his intention that any gaps in the
definitions should be accorded their "common dictionary meaning, except
as expressly qualified by the act." 45 Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary
defines "employee" as "one employed by another usually for wages or sala-
ry and in a position below the executive level."A6 In Black's Law Dictio-
nary, "employee" means "[a] person who works in the service of another
person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under
which the employer has the right to control the details of work perfor-
mance. 'A7 The word "employer" is defined as "[a] person who controls and
directs a worker under an express or implied contract of hire and who pays
the worker's salary or wages.
'" 8
Interpreting the Act's purpose narrowly, the district court in McBroom
v. Western Electric Co., Inc.,49 stated that Congress was seeking to "elimi-
nate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or limiting one's livelih-
ood simply because of one's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.
'50
By inserting the italicized portion into its analysis, the court narrowed the
purpose of the legislature from preventing all discrimination in employment
to a focus on preventing discrimination that threatens individuals economi-
cally.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the United States Supreme Court
narrowed Title VII's purpose in another way when it held that the secondary
purpose of the statute is to make whole those who are injured by employ-
42. Id. (citations omitted) (Even though this decision occurred before the passage of
Title VII, the Court's analysis remains applicable in all uses of the word "employee.").
Accord Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340. "[T]he construction of the word employee should
encompass the history and purpose of the statute." Id.
43. See Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
44. Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990).
45. 110 Cong. Rec. 7216 (1964). See also Graves, 907 F.2d at 73; Ortner, supra note
39, at 2625.
46. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004).
48. Id. at 565.
49. 429 F. Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
50. Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
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ment discrimination.5 On first glance, this may not seem to alter the appli-
cation of Title VII, but by defining this as the statute's secondary purpose,
the Court inadvertently limited who is protected by the statute. For exam-
ple, courts have reasoned that because volunteers are unpaid workers, the
remedy of back pay is "wholly inappropriate," and, therefore, the statute
offers no true recourse for these workers.52 Courts have used this reasoning
to deny Title VII protection to unpaid workers and volunteers. 53 The Smith
court acknowledged in passing that volunteers do have the option of seeking
injunctive relief but seemingly dismissed that as insignificant. 14
Some courts, and many plaintiffs, seek a broad interpretation of the de-
finitions and provisions of Title VII, believing that this is Congress' true
intention.55 One example of this involves the express exclusion of certain
workers under the definition of employee in the language of the statute.56
The argument is that the exclusion of specific workers infers that Congress
intended to "cover the full range of workers who may be subject to the
harms the statute was designed to prevent," and, therefore, any workers not
specifically excluded may seek the protection of the statute.57 These indi-
viduals, however, have generally not received protection under Title VII.
E. Applying Title VII to Volunteers-Judicial Interpretation
Because of the ambiguous nature of the definitions in Title VII, it has
been up to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether unpaid
workers and volunteers are entitled to protection under the Act. Whether
there exists a sufficient employment relationship between the parties is
normally the key question in these cases.58 Because employment relation-
ship is not defined within the statute, courts use several tests in making this
51. 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975).
52. E.g., Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987). But
see discussion infra Part III.B.3.
53. See, e.g., Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 794.
54. Id. See also Dunn, supra note 25, at 466. "[T]he court [in Smith] downplayed the
significant remedy that would exist for volunteer workers: injunctive relief requiring, for
example, cessation of discriminatory conduct or reinstatement of a volunteer worker pre-
viously terminated due to illegal discrimination." Id. For a discussion of remedies that might
exist for unpaid workers, see Part III.B.3 of this note.
55. Dunn, supra note 25, at 466 (citing EEOC v. Pettegrove Trucking Serv., 716 F.
Supp. 1430, 1433 (S.D. Fla. 1989)). See also Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th
Cir. 1983). "(T]he term employee is clearly to be given a broad construction under all provi-
sions of the Act." Id.
56. See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1339; see also supra note 29.
57. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1339.
58. Ortner, supra note 39, at 2631. Courts also use the finding of an employment rela-
tionship to determine employer liability, but that is not the focus of this note.
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decision.59 Two commonly used tests include the common-law agency test
and the economic realities test.60 More frequently, however, courts use a
combination of the analyses performed under these two tests.61 Some scho-
lars have labeled this the hybrid test.
62
More important than any of these three tests, however, is the benefits
analysis.63 Courts have consistently held that before a common-law agency
or economic reality test can even begin, there must at least be a plausible
employment relationship.64 This is determined by the benefits analysis.
Next, this note will explain how each test works and will then explore how
the benefits analysis is used, either alone or as a preliminary test preceding
one or both of the two main tests.
1. The Common-Law Agency Test
The common-law agency test refers, at its most basic level, to the de-
gree of control exhibited in the putative employment relationship. 65 In fact,
it is alternatively known as the "right-to-control" test.66 Many courts use
this test because they assume that Congress intended "the conventional mas-
ter-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" to
apply to Title VILI's employer and employee definitions.67
Courts have applied this test mainly in cases concerning a determina-
tion of whether there exists an employer-independent contractor relation-
ship,68 rather than situations in which there is an unpaid worker or volun-
teer.69 In fact, some courts have even held that the control analysis is not
59. See Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 158-70, for a discussion of the different tests used
by courts to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
60. Id. at 158-67.
61. Id. at 167-70.
62. Id.
63. The term "benefits analysis" was created for the purposes of this note.
64. See O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997); Graves v. Women's
Prof I Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1990).
65. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
66. Graves, 907 F.2d at 74. See also Ortner, supra note 39, at 2628.
67. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992).
68. An independent contractor differs from both employees and unpaid workers. Ran-
dall John Chiera & Anthony F. Tagliagambe, An Employee by Any Other Name Is Still an
Employee: Determining Employment Status Under New York Law, N.Y. ST. B.J. 35, 36
(1992). Like paid employees and unpaid workers, independent contractors perform work for
the employer. Id. Independent contractors receive compensation, but unlike paid employees
they have the freedom to make many decisions employees do not. Id. For example, many
independent contractors determine what hours to work, how to accomplish assigned tasks,
and so forth. Id.
69. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1993);
Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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dispositive in volunteer cases.7 On the other hand, the level of control re-
mains a central issue in many cases because it is seen as a fundamental ele-
ment of the employer-employee relationship, but it is not the "sole crite-
rion" to be used.71
The actual right to control held by the putative employer refers not on-
ly to their right to control the end result, but also to control how that result is
accomplished.72 Factors used in determining whether there is sufficient
control by the principal over the worker to give rise to an employment rela-
tionship under Title VII include the following: (1) whether work in this oc-
cupational field is usually performed with or without supervision and direc-
tion; (2) the requisite skill level for that position; (3) which party furnishes
the equipment and place of work; (4) length of time the putative employee
has worked; (5) whether payment is determined by the amount of time
worked or the jobs completed; (6) the manner of termination of the relation-
ship (i.e., one or both parties, with or without notice, etc.); (7) whether an-
nual leave is provided; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the puta-
tive employer's business; (9) whether retirement benefits are accumulated;
(10) whether social security taxes are paid by the putative employer; and
(11) how the parties view the relationship.73 Control is relative, however,
and should be judged based on the employer's authority to use that control,
not by whether it is actually exercised.74
One problem with the right-to-control test is that it does not always ac-
curately determine an employer-employee relationship. The Eighth Circuit
provided two examples to illustrate this point.75 First, a university's rela-
tionship with its students would meet the requirements for the employer-
employee relationship under this test.76 The university controls the actions
of the students in many ways through rules and deadlines. 77 The court ac-
knowledged there might even be a sufficient amount of control over poten-
tial students because of the requirements they must meet for admittance.78
Second, the court illustrated its point by suggesting that even American
70. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 (N.D.
Ohio 2008); Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221.
71. Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 72 (8th Cir. 1990).
72. Ortner, supra note 39, at 2628 (quoting Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp.
513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978)).
73. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222 (citing Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 982
(4th Cir. 1983)).
74. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26
WM. & MARY L. REv. 75, 80-81 (1984).






Express could be construed to have employer-employee relationships with
its cardholders and vendors because of the rules they are subjected to.79 In
light of these examples, it is easy to see why some have criticized the com-
mon-law agency test as limited, mechanical, and inconsistent with consider-
ation of contextual circumstances, leading to the greatest number of poten-
tial "employees" being excluded from the statute's protections.8 °
2. The Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test, focusing on how economically dependent
the individual is on the work he performs, was first formulated by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Bartels v. Birmingham.8' Often, the
economic realities test is framed as a balance of power argument, 2 asking
whether the worker, for example, has the power or ability to get up and
walk away from the position or make necessary changes.83 "Obviously con-
trol is characteristically associated with the employer-employee relationship
but in the application of social legislation employees are those who as a
matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they
render service. 84 In other words, this test tries to discern the true "econom-
ic reality" of the parties' relationship: To what degree is the worker affected
by the business's changes, successes, and failures? Is it an employer-
employee relationship or not? One Sixth Circuit court put it this way:
"[O]ne must examine the economic realities underlying the relationship
between the individual and the so-called principal in an effort to determine
whether that individual is likely to be susceptible to the discriminatory prac-
tices which the act was designed to eliminate.8 5 The theory behind this
statement is that the more economically dependent individuals are, the more
they might be forced to endure discrimination or harassment to maintain
their position.
The courts employ several factors in an economic realities analysis,
and they are remarkably similar to those used in the common-law agency
analysis.8 6 In fact, some scholars have suggested that the true test used by
79. Id.
80. Dowd, supra note 74, at 83.
81. 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (determining whether an individual was an independent
contractor for purposes of payment of social security taxes).
82. See Dowd, supra note 74, at 102.
83. Id.
84. Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130.
85. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983).
86. See Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 222 (4th Cir.
1993) (citing Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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courts is actually a hybrid of the two.87 Like those used by the
right-to-control test, the factors laid out by the courts for an economic reali-
ties analysis include:
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the man-
ner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged em-
ployee's opportunity for profit or loss depending on his manageri-
al skill; (3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or
materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (4)
whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the de-
gree of permanence of the working relationship; and (6) whether
the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's
business.88
3. The Benefits Analysis-An Alternative? A Threshold?
Rather than use one of the previous tests, many courts have chosen to
rely simply on a determination of the sufficiency of the benefits received by
the worker in question.89 For other courts, the benefits analysis has instead
often been used as a threshold analysis for both the common-law agency
and economic realities tests. Under the second option, the court uses the
benefits analysis to determine whether or not a "hire" has occurred, which is
a prerequisite to being able to use either the common-law agency test or the
economic realities test.90
If being used as a threshold analysis, the dispositive question for a
benefits analysis is whether, and to what degree, the worker received either
direct or indirect remuneration. 91 If he or she did receive remuneration, a
"hire" has occurred, and the court may proceed to using the common-law
agency test or the economic realities test to determine whether or not an
individual is an employee under Title VII.
92
In almost all unpaid worker cases, however, the remuneration may be
insufficient or nonexistent; the second part of the analysis is, therefore, in-
applicable and the worker is not an employee.93 If no financial benefit is
87. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 167-68.
88. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
89. The court must determine whether the benefits received are sufficient to warrant a
finding of an employment relationship. See e.g., Haavistola, 6. F.3d at 221-22.
90. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529-30
(N.D. Ohio 2008).
91. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d
Cir. 1999); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997).
92. O'Connor, 126 F.3dat 115.
93. Id. at 115-16.
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received, courts have found that "no plausible employment relationship can
exist" because compensation is an essential condition to an employment
relationship. 94 This is not to say that an individual must be salaried or earn
an hourly wage to be an employee. The Second Circuit has held that it is
"clear" that an employment relationship sufficient for Title VII can exist
even if no wages are paid as long as the worker receives "numerous job-
related benefits. 95
Courts seem divided on what constitutes "numerous job-related bene-
fits." Some cases are clear-cut: the volunteers receive absolutely no bene-
fits-they are simply donating their time for nothing in exchange. Thus,
there is no benefit and the volunteer is not an employee. When the volunteer
receives something in exchange for their services, the benefits determination
can become unclear.
In Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., the plaintiff
was a volunteer firefighter who was sexually assaulted by another volun-
teer.96 When she sued for sex discrimination under Title VII, the district
court granted summary judgment to the defendant. 97 It was undisputed that
Haavistola received no direct remuneration 98 yet she did receive many ben-
efits as a result of her services, including group life insurance, state-funded
disability pension, workers compensation coverage, tuition reimbursement
for certain job-related courses, and survivors' benefits for dependents. 99 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit discussed Haavistola's benefits in detail and ulti-
mately remanded the case, finding that the sufficiency of benefits with re-
spect to the existence of an employment relationship is a question of fact
rather than law; summary judgment was, therefore, inappropriate. 100
In a similar case, Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Farming-
ville Fire District, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's finding that
Pietras was an employee of the Farmingville Fire Department.' 0 Pietras
was in training with the department and was considered a probationary fire-
fighter.'0 2 Although she did not receive a salary or wages, state law and
94. Id. at 116.
95. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473.
96. 6F.3d211,213 (4thCir. 1993).
97. Id. at 214.
98. Id. at 219.
99. Id. at 221 (listing all of the benefits that Haavistola received).
100. Id. at 221-22. The Fourth Circuit disagreed that this was a matter of law because no
statutory or case law defined what level of compensation was sufficient; it is, therefore, a
matter for the fact-finder. Id. Despite the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the jury on remand found
that the facts did not support a determination that Haavistola was an "employee." Haavistola,
839 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1994).
101. 180 F.3d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1999).
102. Id. at 471. To become a full member, Pietras and others were required to pass a
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department by-laws awarded several benefits to Pietras and others like
her. 10 3 She was entitled to a retirement pension, life insurance, death bene-
fits, disability insurance, and even some medical benefits.,
0 4
In an interesting twist, in Raft v. Thompson'0 5 the court held that even
nonmonetary benefits could be sufficient. 0 6 After Dr. Rafi was not selected
for volunteer positions with the National Human Genome Research Institute
and the National Institute of Health, he made a Title VII claim against the
institutions. 10 7 Dr. Rafi presented evidence to show that there was a "clear
path to employment" for volunteers. 10 8 That is, there was a high conversion
rate of volunteers moving into full-time paid positions. 10 9 The judge held
that this might constitute sufficient compensation and ruled that Dr. Rafi




Volunteers provide a valuable, essential service to our nation. Our
economy depends on volunteerism, yet our laws provide insignificant pro-
tections for unpaid workers in the places in which they work or volunteer.
If the issue is approached practically, rather than theoretically, justice would
require that volunteers-who share many characteristics with employees-
be protected by antidiscrimination legislation such as Title VII.1" As men-
tioned earlier, 112 many erroneously believe that unpaid workers are not sus-
ceptible to the evils of discrimination and harassment.' ' 3 This belief is
based on the faulty assumption that the only reason that one would "put up
with" such treatment is in order to protect his or her economic security; be-
medical exam, a written exam, and a physical agility test. The physical agility test was the
subject of her Title VII sex discrimination claim; she had already passed the other two tests.
Id. at n.1.
103. Id. at 471.
104. Id.






111. Desautels, supra note 2, at 135.
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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cause an unpaid worker does not depend economically on his position, so
the reasoning goes, he is free to leave if harassed or treated discriminately.
Likewise, in situations where an individual is denied a position-albeit an
unpaid or volunteer position-based on his membership in one of the pro-
tected classes, proponents of this view argue that there is no economic de-
triment to the individual and instead adopt a "no harm, no foul" approach.
If a paid employee and a volunteer are both subjected to sexual ha-
rassment by a supervisor, the above logic would suggest that the employee
has economic incentives not to speak up or quit her job: her financial well-
being, job stability, and future career goals. The volunteer, on the other
hand, has no reason to stay, nor does he experience any detriment from
leaving or from speaking up about the harassment. This argument is erro-
neous for many reasons.
First, unpaid workers are rarely wholly gratuitous. In fact, many vo-
lunteers receive at least some form of benefits;" 14 for some volunteers, these
benefits can be quite significant. For example, they may receive monetary
benefits, in-kind benefits, job experience, or even the proverbial "foot in the
door" for future employment. Even when volunteers receive no tangible
benefits, though, they are doing the work for some reason, perhaps simply a
"warm, fuzzy feeling, ' 1' 5 or the personal satisfaction they receive from
serving. Regardless of how many or how few benefits they receive, by
speaking up about discrimination or harassment they risk losing these bene-
fits and the opportunity to continue their work.
Second, unpaid workers that are victims of discrimination or harass-
ment in an employment context experience other detriments as well.
Whether they remain in their position or not, these individuals experience a
multitude of negative effects. These can include stigma or ridicule in the
community, alienation from friends or coworkers, and an inability to find
similar work. These individuals may also experience emotional setbacks,
such as feeling ashamed or blaming themselves for what happened or their
reaction to it. Finally, for many individuals internships and volunteer expe-
riences are necessary stepping stones to future employment." 6 Being de-
prived of that experience can have serious effects on one's education and
career. 1
7
Arguably, volunteers and unpaid workers are more susceptible to ha-
rassment and discrimination because of their status as "non-employees."
'"18
114. See supra Part II.E.3 for a discussion of benefits.
115. Attard, supra note 23, at 1090.
116. David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CoNN. L.
REv. 215, 215 (2002).
117. See id.
118. See James J. LaRocca, Lowery v. Klemnm: A Failed Attempt at Providing Unpaid
2009]
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One possible reason is that supervisors and coworkers may see volunteers as
a temporary workforce-more susceptible to harassment because they will
soon leave. 19 Similarly, particularly in intern situations, there is often a
large imbalance of power between the worker and the supervisor. This po-
sition of power is often abused. In commenting on the Washington, D.C.
intern culture, columnist Andrew Sullivan wrote: "Some of what goes on is
truly depressing.... I know one longtime Washingtonian who even re-
ferred to each influx of interns, jokingly, as 'the flesh."",120 Sullivan's ob-
servations demonstrate the exploitive relationship between experienced
politicians in Washington, D.C., and the young, relatively inexperienced
interns.1 2' This is an example of how being an intern can increase the like-
lihood of discrimination, rather than diminish it. This gives employers little
incentive to curb discrimination.
Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to these factors, with the current
status of the laws, unscrupulous employers or supervisors may exploit the
fact that the law provides no recourse for unpaid workers; they are ineligible
for damages, reinstatement, or even injunctive relief under the current em-
ployment laws.
These results are contrary to public policy. Our culture has a strong
public policy against discrimination and harassment in any form. We have
numerous statutes aiming to protect people based on different classifications
and in different situations. Committing discriminatory or harassing acts can
correctly lead to disastrous consequences, such as suspension or termina-
tion, public criticism, community disrespect, and civil liability. Strictly
from a public policy standpoint, the discrimination or harassment of any
worker-paid or unpaid-is wrong and should be prohibited, prevented, and
punished. With such community support behind preventing discrimination
and harassment, it does not make sense to have laws that are ineffective in
achieving this purpose.
Unpaid workers are usually doing this type of work for one of two rea-
sons: (1) to gain job experience and promote future career goals, 122 or (2) to
give back to society in a way that is meaningful to them. 123 Both of these
Interns and Volunteers with Adequate Employment Protections, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 131,
140 (2006).
119. Id.
120. Andrew Sullivan, The Way We Live Now: 7-22-01; Sex and This City, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 22, 2001, at 15. Mr. Sullivan currently operates The Daily Dish on
www.andrewsullivan.com and is a senior editor at The New Republic.
121. See id.
122. See Ortner, supra note 39, for a discussion on the growing importance of internships
to obtaining gainful employment.
123. See Attard, supra note 23, at 1090.
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motives are praiseworthy and should be promoted by society and its laws.
It is unacceptable for these individuals to be subjected to discrimination, but
still it happens. Volunteers or interns may be discriminated against by not
being "hired" or promoted; by receiving different, lesser, or demeaning
jobs; by being segregated based on their protected status; or through ha-
rassment, insults, or demeaning treatment. These are only a handful of the
possibilities. None of them are acceptable. It is essential that Congress and
the courts take affirmative steps to eliminate this practice and provide the
employment protections that our nation's volunteers deserve.
B. Legal Recognition of Unpaid Workers as Title VII Employees
The most effective way to eliminate employment discrimination and
harassment against unpaid workers is for the law to recognize them as em-
ployees. The most efficient way for this to happen is for Congress to amend
the Title VII "employee" definition to include unpaid workers such as vo-
lunteers and interns. In recognizing the complexity of passing a statutory
amendment in Congress, there are ways for these interests to be promoted in
the meantime. First, state legislatures can enact similar legislation. Second,
courts must come to a consensus on which employment test will be used in
order to achieve consistency and efficiency. Finally, employers and work-
ers can minimize litigation by agreeing, in writing, about the designation of
the parties' relationship.
1. The Best Solution-A Title VII Amendment
Although scholars have proposed many different solutions, the best
way to resolve the conflict in the courts, the circular nature of the laws, and
the inadequate level of protection that this country provides volunteers is to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to expressly include unpaid
workers. This change would not eliminate all of the problems of interpreta-
tion that Title VII presents, but it is a good starting point and would provide
several benefits.
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) provides a decent
starting model. In FECA, employees include "individual[s] rendering per-
sonal service to the United States . . . without pay or for nominal pay."'
' 24
Noting this, one author suggested that Title VII be amended using the fol-
lowing phrase: "an individual under an employer's control who provides
personal service to an employer, without pay or for nominal pay."'
125
124. Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(b) (2006).
125. Dunn, supra note 25, at 471.
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This definition, however, would only complicate the already protracted
litigation over what constitutes "control," as well as adding the extra analy-
sis of whether the worker provides "personal service." Furthermore, the use
of the word "pay" in the definition proposed above would likely cause con-
fusion, with some courts construing the word in its plain and literal sense-
a salary or wage-and other courts construing "pay" as a concept that em-
bodies both economic and other benefits.
The shortcomings of this author's suggestion are easy to fix. By sim-
plifying the definition and using broader, less ambiguous language, a sug-
gested modification might be as follows: "Employee means an individual
employed by an employer, including those who provide services for an em-
ployer without benefits or for nominal benefits."
2. Alternative and Interim Solutions
Such an amendment obviously will not be enacted overnight. In the
meantime, it is important for state legislatures, the judicial system, and em-
ployers to not ignore the plight of these workers and to understand the
shortcomings of the Act as written.
State legislatures can help by enacting similar legislation. Every state
has some form of employment discrimination law on the books.126 For
these states, they only need to amend their statutes to redefine "employee"
like proposed for Title VII.127 For states that do not currently have compre-
hensive employment discrimination laws, such laws should be enacted and
should contain provisions like the one advocated. Ideally, both Congress
and the states should enact this type of legislation. This way there is essen-
tially a double layer of protection, and workers have an option of state or
federal recourse. If both Congress and state legislatures take affirmative
steps to protect unpaid workers, the community and the courts will receive
the clear message that this behavior will not be tolerated and that victimized
workers have rights and remedies, regardless of their pay status.
Courts, too, can actively protect the rights of unpaid workers through
the resolution of litigation. To do this, courts must reach a consensus on
which employment test should be used. This is important not only for con-
sistency, but also for judicial efficiency. As part of this task, the courts
must consider public policy, the effects of each of the employment tests,
126. Many state antidiscrimination laws mimic Title VII, but some states provide for
more, less, or different protected classes than Title VII's "race, color, religion, sex, or nation-
al origin." Alabama, for example, only mentions age discrimination, ALA. CODE § 25-1-21
(2008), but Hawaii mentions sexual orientation, court or arrest record, marital status, and
disability in addition to the five Title VII classes, HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2008).
127. See supra Part III.B.1.
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and logical and fair results. Although this is something that can be done in
the time before Congress amends the Act, the courts must take these steps
regardless. These are issues that are likely to still arise even after imple-
mentation of the suggested amendment. Recognizing this and the impor-
tance of their decisions, courts should act quickly to develop a consistent
and appropriate model.
The courts are not the only ones, however, who can aid this process.
Employers can-and should--clearly define the relationship they have with
their employees, volunteers, and interns. The parties should agree in writing
that discrimination will not be tolerated, and the agreement should also de-
tail each party's rights and responsibilities.
128
3. Advantages and Benefits ofAmending Title VII
The main purpose of amending Title VII is to provide statutory protec-
tion to unpaid workers against discrimination and harassment, but there are
many secondary benefits as well. Consistent with the general purpose of
Title VII, the suggested amendment would further eliminate workplace dis-
crimination and provide for more productive and welcoming work environ-
ments. Increased productivity is a benefit not only to individual employers,
but also to our national economy as well. As alluded to earlier, amending
Title VII would help "avoid protracted litigation over the threshold determi-
nation of employee status," as well as provide a "benefit to plaintiffs, de-
fendants, and the legal system."'
129
Plaintiffs benefit the most, though, because they now have a statutory
right to be free of discrimination in their volunteer position. Perhaps more
importantly, this amendment would provide plaintiffs with recourse if they
are the victims of discrimination, opening a plethora of remedies for unpaid
workers. Title VII and the courts currently provide many remedies for
wronged workers, and it is unfair to exclude unpaid workers entirely simply
because the remedies of back pay or front pay are inappropriate. 130 These
remedies can include attorney's fees, reinstatement, injunctive relief, and
even compensatory and punitive damages when appropriate.
4. Remaining Concerns
Even with new language specifically including unpaid workers, it will
be up to the courts to interpret and apply the law appropriately. One fore-
128. See, e.g., 1 LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE & HOUR LAW § 3:15 (2008)
(applies to FLSA, not Title VII).
129. Yamada, supra note 116, at 246.
130. See, e.g., Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
2009]
UALR LAW REVIEW
seeable concern is that courts will still have to determine if there is a signif-
icant enough relationship' 3 ' between the volunteer and the employer to war-
rant protection for the volunteer and liability for the employer. Arguably,
this determination will never become obsolete, but making the suggested
changes will decrease the amount of guesswork courts must do. By ex-
pressly including unpaid workers, for example, the courts will no longer
have to analyze whether the benefits are sufficient, or whether the worker is
economically dependent on the position.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the enormous impact of volunteerism on America's culture and
economy, as well as the increasing necessity of volunteer and intern expe-
rience for individuals, the statutory protections afforded to unpaid workers
are sadly lacking. Employment discrimination statutes such as Title VII fail
to properly define "employee," and courts inconsistently apply the law.
An amendment to Title VII's definition of "employee" that would in-
clude unpaid workers is imperative. Volunteers would then be entitled to
powerful remedies now reserved solely for paid workers, such as reinstate-
ment, injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. Enacting such an
amendment would be consistent with public policy considerations encour-
aging volunteerism and discouraging discrimination.
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